

Human Security: *Linking Development and Security in an Age of Terror*

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Summary

Human security is commonly understood as prioritising the security of people, especially their welfare, safety and well-being, rather than that of states. Instead of examining human security as a measurable or specific condition, however, the focus here is how human security as a technology of governance facilitates the way that populations living within the territories of ineffective states are understood, differentiated and acted upon by aid institutions emanating from effective ones. In order to do this, development is first defined biopolitically, that is, as a security technology related to promoting the life of populations that, compared to the inhabitants of developed societies, are essentially 'non-insured'. Of special interest in this paper is how human security as a relation of governance has continued to evolve in relation to the war on terrorism. At the close of the 1990s, human security encapsulated a vision of integrating existing aid networks into a coordinated, international system of intervention able to complement the efforts of ineffective states in securing their citizens and economies. Compared to this more universalistic notion of human security, in which development and security were regarded as 'different but equal', the war on terrorism has deepened the interconnection between development and security. In particular, it is refocusing aid resources on those sub-populations, regions and issues seen as presenting a risk to homeland security. While some non-governmental organisations are concerned over growing threats to independence, for others new possibilities and opportunities for state/non-state interaction have emerged.

The concept of human security is emblematic of the changed relations and governmental technologies that shape the post-Cold War security terrain. While definitions vary, it addresses a world in which the threat of catastrophic nuclear war between leading states has been replaced by a concern for the well-being of people living within ineffective ones. Their ability to enjoy complete, safe and fulfilled lives – their human security – has moved from the shadows of domestic affairs onto the international political agenda. Failure to achieve human security risks disillusionment and civil conflict among groups, communities and peoples; it threatens states from inside as it were and hence global order itself. Human security embodies a notion of security that goes beyond conventional

concerns with military capacity and the defence of borders. Human security approaches usually treat an expanded range of social and developmental variables as being able to constitute an international security threat. Poverty, population displacement, HIV/AIDS, environmental breakdown and social exclusion, for example, all bear directly on human and hence global security. The concept of human security has achieved striking prominence in the post-Cold War period. The term has gained widespread currency and, over the past few years in particular, has attracted a growing institutional interest. There has been a proliferation of government, practitioner and academic networks,¹ university centres, courses and research initiatives,² publications,³ official reports⁴ and international commissions that draw directly on ideas around human security. Established in 2001, for example, was the independent International Commission on Human Security co-chaired by Professor Amartya Sen and the former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata.⁵ In the same year, a separate International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty sponsored by the Canadian government suggested that human security is,

...increasingly providing a conceptual framework for international action [...] there is growing recognition world-wide that the protection of human security, including human rights and human dignity, must be one of the fundamental objectives of modern international institutions (ICISS, 2001: 6).

The rise of human security is usually portrayed as resulting from a growing humanism within the international system that draws on increasingly accepted norms and conventions associated with the UN Declaration of Human Rights, the Geneva Conventions, the founding of the International Criminal Court, and so on (Ibid). In the words of Astri Suhrke, human security "...evokes 'progressive values'" (quoted by Mack 2002: 3). Rather than examining human security from a humanistic perspective, this essay regards human security as a principle of formation. That is, as producing the 'humans' requiring securing and, at the same time, calling forth the state/non-state networks of aid, subjectivity and political practice necessary for that undertaking. Rather than rehearse the conceptual disputes surrounding the definition of human security (see Paris, 2001; King and Murray, 2001), the concern here is with human security as a relation of governance. Rather than focussing on human security as a specific condition

¹ Noteworthy examples include 'The Human Security Network' launched in 1999 at a foreign ministerial level and involving the governments of Austria, Canada, Chile, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Slovenia, Thailand and, as an observer status, South Africa (www.humansecuritynetwork.org/). Also, the UNESCO Forum on Human Security (www.unesco.org/securipax/) and the Human Security News Association bringing together freelance journalists and web-builders (www.humansecurity.org.uk). The Development Studies Association also has a Conflict and Human Security study group (www.devstud.org.uk/studygroups/conflict.htm).

² The universities of Harvard, Oxford and Tufts, for example, have established major institutes, centres or programs dedicated to human security.

³ For an extensive bibliography see Paris (2001).

⁴ Key official reports include, Boutros-Ghali, Boutros (1992); UNDP (1994); OECD (1998); International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS 2001); Collier, Paul, et al. (2003); Commission on Human Security (CHS 2003). The Canadian based Centre for Human Security (www.ligi.uba.ca/) is in the process of producing an annual Human Security Report, modelled on UNDP's Human Development Report. The first report was due for publication in Autumn 2004.

⁵ www.humansecurity-chs.org/.

or measurable state of existence, the emphasis is on human security as a technology that empowers international institutions and actors to individuate, group and act upon Southern populations.

In exploring the human security as a technology of international governance, the paper is concerned with the interrelationship between the war on terrorism and human security. This takes note of the disquiet felt within many aid agencies over the purported negative effects of the war on terrorism on humanitarian and development assistance (BOND, 2003; CHS, 2003; Oxfam, 2003; Christian Aid, 2004). It can be argued that the 1990s relation of governance encapsulated by human security has undergone a number of important changes. While human security represents the fusion of development and security, the critics argue that the balance has tipped against development and in favour of a 'harder' version of security which prioritises homeland livelihood systems and infrastructures. This incarnation of security threatens to absorb development with, among other things, pressures to reprioritise development criteria in relation to supporting intervention, reconstructing crisis states and, in order to stem terrorist recruitment, protecting livelihoods and promoting opportunity within strategically important areas of instability. For its critics, the war on terrorism has reversed the progress made during the 1990s in promoting a universalistic human rights agenda and refocusing aid on poverty reduction. However, before rushing to declare a "...new Cold War" (Ibid), the paper will explore the governmental components of human security beginning with a brief examination of biopolitics.

Biopolitics and Human Security

Foucault's conception of biopolitics is, at first glance, not wholly applicable to the typical site of human security, that is, populations defined by 'underdevelopment' (Foucault 2003: 239-264; 1998 135-159; 1991b). What is being discussed in Foucault's work is a biopolitics of metropolitan or 'developed' society. While it is possible to usefully extend his insights to development practice, the seminal difference between developed and underdeveloped populations in biopolitical terms must be first explored.⁶ This was graphically illustrated in the great Asian tsunami disaster at the end of 2004. Although the human cost and physical destruction was of an entirely different order, within 24 hours the world's leading reinsurance companies had estimated that their losses would be half the £14 billion incurred during the hurricanes that hit Florida in summer of the same year. The reason being, "...fewer people in the area's affected by the huge sea surges are insured" (Harding and Wray 2004). This distinction between an 'insured' and a 'non-insured' population broadly understood is suggestive of how development and underdevelopment can be distinguished biopolitically. Populations defined by

⁶ Foucault did not directly consider biopolitics in relation to colonial and developmental regimes. Moreover, a number of influential writers have invoked him in this context without using the concept, for example, Said (1995), Escobar (1995), and Crush (1995). For an analysis of biopolitics in relation to colonialism see Stoler (1995), and for development see Brigg (2002). Dillon and Reid (2001) and Dillon (2004) are extremely useful in laying out the biopolitical problematic and drawing out its global implications. This essay, however, specifically explores development as a biopolitics associated with a self-reproducing species-life.

'development' exist in relation to massified and pluralistic welfare regimes that, in addition private insurance cover, include comprehensive state-based or regulated safety-nets covering health care, education, employment protection and pensions. In contrast, those classed as 'underdeveloped' are distinguished by the absence of such massified life-support mechanisms; they are, essentially, non-insured.

This absence however, has historically has been compensated by a countervailing presence. Since the eighteenth century a recurrent feature of the defining encounter between the agents of 'modernity' and the incumbents of 'tradition' has been for the former to regard the latter as essentially self-reproducing in terms of their basic welfare, economic and social requirements. The savage or natural man of the Enlightenment, for example, is an epitome of self-reliance. Self-reproduction, and the natural resilience that this imparts, has long been axiomatic for people understood through the register of tradition, simplicity, backwardness and race.⁷ This pervasive assumption is illustrated, for example, in the IMF's futurology of global welfare regimes. In the former Soviet Union, where modernisation has already atomised households, extended welfare safety-nets are required. In less developed countries, however, the extended family and community "...operates relatively well as an informal social security scheme obviating the need for the urgent introduction of large-scale public pensions" (quoted by Deacon et al. 1997: 64). From this perspective, development is a set of compensatory and ameliorative technologies concerned with maintaining equilibrium among populations understood as self-reproducing.

According to Foucault, the emergence of biopolitics marks the passage from the classical to the modern age. Its appearance is located in the difference between the ancient right of the sovereign to take life or let live and a new power "...to foster life or disallow it to the point of death" (Foucault 1998: 138). Beginning in the seventeenth century, this new power over life evolved in two basic forms. The first was a disciplinary and individualising power, focusing on the *human-as-machine* and associated with the emergence of the great institutions of medicine, education, punishment, the military, and so on (see Foucault 1991a). From the middle of the eighteenth century, however, a different but complementary power over life emerges. This newer form is not associated with the human-as-machine, it is an aggregating or massifying power concerned with the *human-as-species*. Rather than individualising, it is a regulatory power that operates at the collective level of population (Foucault 2003: 243). Regulatory biopolitics functions differently from institutionally-based disciplinary power. The multiple social, economic and political factors that aggregate to characterise a population appear at the level of the individual as chance, unpredictable and contingent events. Rather than acting on the individual *per se*, a regulatory biopolitics seeks to intervene at the level of the collective where apparently random events reveal themselves as population trends, constants and probabilities. Biopolitics utilises forecasts, statistical estimates and overall measures "...to intervene at the level at which these general phenomena are determined" (Ibid). Based upon centrally directed hygienic campaigns and educational programmes, the emergence of public health from curative medicine is an early example of a regulatory biopower.

⁷ For the nineteenth century see Cowen and Shenton (1995).

Biopolitics is a security mechanism that works through regulatory interventions that seek to establish equilibrium, maintain an average or compensate for variations at the level of population. Security in this context relates to improving the collective resilience of a given population against the contingent and uncertain nature of its existence.⁸ Moreover, achieving such outcomes required complex systems of state-based coordination and centralisation less important for the functioning of a more localised, institution-based disciplinary power. Such a disciplinary power, however, especially its ability to regiment a populace, was an essential prerequisite of the industrial revolution and the spread of the factory system. A regulatory biopolitics appears in the context of a related mass phenomenon of capitalism: the emergence of an industrial species-life that, through dispossession and dependence on wage-labour, had lost the resilience of an earlier agrarian self-sufficiency.⁹ By end of the nineteenth century, compensating insurance-based technologies began to emerge with state-encouraged individual savings schemes for housing, sickness and pensions (Foucault 2003: 251). During the twentieth century, state-based insurance schemes began to expand. It was following WWII, however, that social-democratic states introduced comprehensive and massified welfare regimes that used national insurance and tax receipts to support a ‘cradle to grave’ system of health care, educational provision, unemployment benefit and pensions.

The ‘non-insured’, that is, self-reliant nature of an ‘underdeveloped’ population does not mean that a regulatory biopolitics is absent. To the contrary, such a biopolitics emerges, grows alongside and complements that of mass society. Those various disciplinary and regulatory interventions that constitute the linked technologies of humanitarian relief and development – or, to be more specific, protection and betterment – constitute an historic biopolitics of self-reliant species-life. Relief and development (here jointly referred to as ‘development’) function to maintain the dynamic equilibrium of a self-reproducing or underdeveloped population. Since the nineteenth century the recurrent security task of development has been to reconcile the disruptive effects of progress on indigenous peoples, such as, commercial exploitation, impoverishment and unchecked urbanisation, with the need for societal order (Cowen and Shenton 1995). From this perspective, the interconnection between development and security can be seen as a recurrent and episodic strategisation of power in which securing self-reliant species-life and maintaining its cohesion is essential for the defence of mass society and international order (Duffield, 2005).

This brief overview of biopolitics provides a base from which to approach human security as a international security technology operating at the level of non-insured or self-reliant population. To appreciate the specific biopolitical character of human security it is necessary to examine in more depth its institutional origins. If, as is

⁸ In *Society Must be Defended* (2003: 253-261), Foucault expands this biopolitical analysis of security to include the emergence of state racism during the nineteenth century and the subsequent development of Nazism. The later being a paroxysmal expression of biopolitics involving extreme forms of both disciplinary and regulatory power.

⁹ For a related discussion see Arendt (1998).

commonly argued, human security represents the merging of development and security (King and Murray, 2001), it remains to explore each of these component parts in turn.

Developing Humans

Within the various assumptions and practices that constitute 'development' it is possible to recognise a biopolitics of life operating at the international level. That is, those varied economic, educational, health and political interventions aimed at improving the resilience and well-being of people whose existence is defined by the contingencies of 'underdevelopment'. While development programmes contain individualising disciplinary elements, typically in the form of projects, they also seek to strengthen the resilience of collectivities and populations. Towards this end, development draws widely on regulatory mechanisms, risk management techniques and compensatory programmes that act at the aggregate level of economic and social life. In particular, development is a biopolitical security mechanism associated with populations understood as essentially self-reproducing in relation to their basic social and welfare needs.

The type of development that constitutes the present foundation of human security is more accurately defined as 'sustainable development'. A popular definition is that of the 1987 World Commission on Environment and Development: sustainable development is a "...development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (quoted by Adams, 1993: 208). In bringing together the domains of development and the environment, the idea of sustainable development grew to become the developmental *leitmotif* of the 1980s. Despite being widely criticised for its lack of conceptual rigour, the phrase quickly entered the rhetoric of politicians, UN agencies and NGOs.

Under the banner of sustainable development, formal development practice embraced a human, people-centred focus that not only prioritised the development of people ahead of states, it also decoupled human development from any direct or mechanical connection with economic growth. The move towards sustainable development was a move away from an earlier dominance of state-led modernisation strategies based on the primacy of economic growth and assumptions that the underdeveloped world would, after passing through various stages, eventually resemble the developed. Rather than economic growth *per se*, a broader approach to development emerged based on aggregate improvements in health, education, employment and social inclusion as an essential precursor for the realisation of market opportunity. The UNDP, for example, launched its annual *Human Development Report* in 1990, dedicating it to "...ending the mismeasure of human progress by economic growth alone" (UNDP 1996: iii). The introduction of the Human Development Index, in particular, with its composite measure of population welfare that includes per capita income, life expectancy and educational attainment, was seen as part of the "...paradigm shift" towards the emerging consensus that "...development progress – both nationally and internationally – must be people-centred, equitably distributed and environmentally and socially sustainable" (Ibid).

Sustainable development defines the type of ‘development’ that is securitised in human security. In promoting diversity and choice, sustainable development is a biopolitics of life. It is concerned with relations and institutions able to act in a regulatory manner on populations as a whole to maintain their equilibrium. This includes, for example, educational measures aimed at enabling the non-insured to understand the contingencies of their existence and to manage better, and compensate for, the risks involved. In bringing together previously unconnected environmental and developmental actors, as a biopolitical assemblage, sustainable development created the possibility for new forms of coordination and centralisation. As an assemblage it brought in non-state actors and multilateral agencies and saw mandates change as well as new ways of interacting emerge. In short, sustainable development forged new means of coordination and centralisation that have the human being rather than the state as the referent object of development.

Discovering Internal War

How conflict has been understood in the post-Cold War period is central to understanding the concept of ‘security’ within human security. It defines the nature of the threat that a developmental biopolitics defends populations against. Reflecting the move from states to people already rehearsed in sustainable development, conflict similarly moves its locus from wars between states to conflicts within them. As with sustainable development, population is also the terrain on which such conflicts are fought. This is both in terms of livelihood systems and social networks being the object of attack and attrition as well as providing sites of resistance and counter-attack. Both development and security within human security take life as the referent object.

A new international consensus on the changed nature of war emerged in the early 1990s. Not only had hopes of a new era of post-Cold War peace been confounded by the persistence of conflict in many developing countries, the very nature of conflict was said to have altered. It became accepted that today’s wars, unlike the past, were increasingly “...within States rather than between States”. These wars were “...often of a religious or ethnic character and often involving unusual violence and cruelty” largely directed against civilians (Boutros-Ghali 1995: 7). Emerging at the same time as the idea of human security, this ‘changing nature of conflict’ refrain has since become an established truth recycled *ad nauseam* in policy documents, academic works and the media. It holds that these new wars, unlike the past, are largely civil conflicts in which warring parties not only show no restraint regarding human life and cultural institutions but also deliberately target essential infrastructures and livelihood systems for criminal gain (International Alert, 1999; Collier, 2000; DFID et al. 2003). While the accuracy of this ‘changing nature of conflict’ *motif* is questionable,¹⁰ it is essential for establishing the problematic of human security. The changing nature of conflict theme sees organised violence as “...development in reverse” (Collier, 2000: ix). Conflict destroys development because, as argued above, development is portrayed as a biopolitical

¹⁰ Several independent datasets, for example, suggest that, rather than being unusual, internal or civil wars have formed the majority of all post-WWII conflicts (Mack, 2002: 15-20). Also see, Monty Marshall, <http://members.aol.com/CSPmgm/globcon2.htm>.

condition of socio-economic homeostasis. By wrecking infrastructures and livelihood systems, tipping them into disequilibrium and increasing the risk of enduring cycles of violence and displacement, conflict becomes redefined as a terminal threat to sustainable development, that is, a self-reliant species-life.

However, by strengthening coping mechanisms and subsistence strategies, sustainable development is also seen as a bulwark against the dangerous enticements and alternative rewards that illegitimate indigenous leaders can present to impoverished and alienated peoples (Carnegie Commission, 1997: ix). It is not just poverty, however, that draws people towards aggressive leaders but, crucially, a sense of resentment derived from exclusion. It is the belief “...among millions of people within society that they have ‘no stake in the system’”; indeed, the more acute the sense of grievance “...the more likely it is that a large number of people will be susceptible to the siren voices of extremists, and believe they have more to gain from war than peace” (Saferworld, 1999: 69). It is a sense of alienation and the legitimate desire for change among the non-insured that the technologies of sustainable development seek to harness and empower in order to improve the self-management of contingency and risk.

During the 1990s, the proposition that poor countries have a higher risk of falling into conflict than rich ones (because the resulting social exclusion can be exploited by violent and criminal leaders) coalesced into a policy consensus (see Collier, 2000). If sustainable development brought the issue of collective self-reproduction centre-stage, the rediscovery of internal war during the 1990s problematised the nature of the state in the developing world. Weak and failing states existing in zones of crisis can be captured by unsuitable rulers. The perception of these rulers as the illegitimate enemies of development, together with concerns that disaffected people are liable to be drawn to them, establishes an interventionist dynamic. A range of conflict resolution and social reconstruction strategies emerge from this dynamic that are geared for the sovereign separation of such leaders from the led while acting governmentally on collectivities and populations to strengthen their resilience and civility (DAC, 1997). The distinct institutional dimensions attaching to the development and security inflections of human security will now be examined.

An emerging technology of international biopolitical order

As an organising concept, human security emerged in the mid 1990s and began to develop considerable institutional depth. Two early documents of enduring influence to human security are UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali’s 1992 *Agenda for Peace* (1995: 42-43), and the UNDP’s *Human Development Report* (1994). With respect to the security dimension of human security, the *Agenda for Peace* was one of the first systematic elaborations of the idea that the post-Cold War period was defined by threats to people’s well-being rather than inter-state conflict. In what is now a well-established human security approach, the *Agenda* argues that the referent object of security is the individual rather than the underdeveloped state and that this broadens the definition of security to include wider environmental, health, demographic, economic and political issues (Boutros-Ghali, 1995: 42-43). Boutros-Ghali calls for these new disruptive

potentialities to be addressed through an extensive international division of labour that includes not only developed states but also UN agencies, NGOs and civil society groups working within “...an integrated approach to human security” (Ibid: 44).

If the *Agenda* has shaped the security dimension of human security, the UNDP’s *Human Development Report* has had equivalent influence with regard to the development dimension. The UNDP presents human security as being constituted by ‘freedom from want’ and ‘freedom from fear’. That is, safety from chronic threats such as hunger and disease, together with protection from damaging disruptions “...in the patterns of daily life” (UNDP, 1994: 23). The UNDP divides life’s contingencies into seven interconnected areas of security: economic, food, health, environment, personal, community and political. While critics have argued that this list is descriptive and lacks an explanation for how these areas are related, the UNDP’s initiative has, nonetheless, been influential. King and Murray, for example, have described the project as a “...unifying event” in terms of launching human security as an assemblage that fused security and development (King and Murray, 2001: 589). The UNDP has stimulated others to suggest more rigorous ways of measuring human security through new and cross-cutting datasets (Ibid; Mack 2002) as well as encouraging more inclusive definitions (Thomas, 2001).

More recently, two events have defined how human security as a biopolitical assemblage has taken shape. The first was the publication at the end of 2001 of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’s report *The Responsibility to Protect*. The second event was the 2003 release of the Commission of Human Security’s *Human Security Now*. These two reports reflect, in a practical sense, how, until recently, the governance networks of human security were being constructed in two complementary but different ways. *The Responsibility to Protect* sees human security at the heart of a redefinition of the nature of sovereignty in respect of the state and the international community. It moves the earlier juridically-based idea of ‘humanitarian intervention’ as requiring authorisation under the UN charter, onto the terrain of moral duty (Warner, 2003).

Evident in *The Responsibility to Protect* is the fact that, while implying a universal ethic, human security (like human rights) has been re-inscribed within the juridico-political architecture of the nation-state. The proposition that human security prioritises people rather than states is more accurately understood in terms of effective states prioritising populations living within ineffective ones.¹¹ This distinction between effective and ineffective states on the terrain of population is central to *The Responsibility to Protect*. In an interconnected and globalised world “...in which security depends on a framework of stable sovereign entities” the existence of failed states who either harbour those that are dangerous to others, or are only able to maintain order “...by means of gross human rights violations, can constitute a risk to people everywhere”. Indeed, there is no longer such a thing “...as a humanitarian catastrophe occurring ‘in a faraway country of which

¹¹ A wide range of labels exists to distinguish between effective and ineffective states. ‘Failing’, ‘weak’ or ‘crisis’ states are usually described in terms of weak institutions and infrastructure, absent or inadequate public services, non-recognition of human rights and predilections to conflict (Maass and Mephram, 2004).

we know little” (ICISS, 2001: 5). When a state is unable or unwilling to ensure the human security of its citizens, the Commission argues “...the principle of non-interference yields to the international responsibility to protect” (Ibid: ix). It is striking that while the security of people rather than the state is prioritised, in practical terms, the Commission remains wedded to reinstating the state:

...a cohesive and peaceful international system is far more likely to be achieved through the cooperation of effective states confident in their place in the world, than in an environment of fragile, collapsed, fragmenting or generally chaotic state entities (Ibid: 8).

Human Security Now, unlike *The Responsibility to Protect*, largely takes the moral case for intervention for granted. The report relates to development and is more concerned with the ‘consolidation’ of global populations. In this respect, *Human Security Now* is more in keeping with the UNDP, not least in holding a similar holistic and interdependent view of human security. Its division of the contingencies of population, however, is more dynamic and integrated with conflict and its effects (also see Mack 2002). It signals for special consideration, for example, human security in relation to conflict and post-conflict recovery; the protection of people on the move; economic insecurity; basic health needs; and non-inflammatory education.

The Commission defines human security as the protection of the vital core of human life through “...protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life” (CHS 2003: 3). Rather than presenting a particularly new definition, or set of innovative ideas for the measurement of human security the emphasis within *Human Security Now* is to encourage the complex and extensive forms of coordination and centralisation necessary for the biopolitical regulation of non-insured populations. Important here is ensuring protection through the building of a comprehensive international infrastructure that shields self-reliance from menacing threats. This requires working institutions at every level of society, including police systems, the environment, health care, education, social safety nets, diplomatic engagements and conflict early warning systems (Ibid: 132). In achieving this ambitious aim, it is noted that there already exist numerous loose networks of actors including UN agencies, NGOs, civil society groups, and private companies that are currently operating such agendas independently of each other. Rather than inventing something new, the main task is to bring these numerous separate initiatives into a coherent global strategy:

To overcome persistent inequality and insecurities, the efforts, practices and successes of all these groups should be linking in national, regional and global alliances. The goal of these alliances could be to create a kind of horizontal, cross-border source of legitimacy that complements that of traditional vertical and compartmentalised structures of institutions and states (Ibid: 142).

Human Security Now argues for a biopolitics of self-reliant species-life based upon international forms of coordination and centralisation largely formed from the integration of existing aid networks, programmes and datasets. It sees such regulatory networks as

collectively having the ability and legitimacy to strengthen the capacity of ineffective states and promote non-insured species-life. This is an ambitious and expansive view of human security as a centralising biopolitics of international security, based within effective states, and aiming to promote self-reliance among non-insured populations.¹²

Taken together, *The Responsibility to Protect* and *Human Security Now* present two interconnected trajectories to human security's institutional framework. The security component of human security is largely concerned with a responsibility to protect, based on the distinction between effective and ineffective states {Wheeler}. Primacy is given to the dangers of the uncontrolled circulatory effects of crisis territories, for example, the ability of humanitarian disaster, instability and poverty to create displacement and migration, promote illicit transborder economies and provide support for terrorist networks, have revealed that all countries and regions are radically interdependent and interconnected. Regarding aid dispensation, this is a 'vertical' formula linking domestic and the foreign agendas. In contrast, while accepting the risks of global circulation, human security's development inflection is more concerned with local consolidation: improving the resilience of non-insured populations through better aid coordination and improved public/private and state/non-state cooperation (Chen et al 2003). As a practical formula for sharing the world with others, this is a 'horizontal' model linking developed and underdeveloped worlds. Development and security interconnect, interrogate and complement each other. During the 1990s, however, policy discourse portrayed the relationship between development and security as one of 'different but equal'. For example, as in the UN's Strategic Framework for Afghanistan when under Taliban authority (UN, 1998). Post 9/11 developments, however, have problematised this conception of international biopolitical order. In consolidating the trend of the 1990s, effective states are rephrasing developmental concerns in terms of the risks of disruptive international circulation. Where necessary and possible, this includes a new emphasis on engaging with crisis states including regime change and/or the reconstruction of the "...sovereign frontier" (Harrison 2004) through strengthening their capacity to secure the economies and people that come with territory. This changing discourse has had important ramifications for NGOs. Agencies have adapted to the altered political landscape with varying entrepreneurial success. While the issue of neutrality has been a concern for some, for others new opportunities have appeared.

The New Global Danger

Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.

President Bush, 18 September 2001.

¹² Similarly ambitious visions of human security have recently been echoed in the European context: "An effective human security approach requires coordination between intelligence, foreign policy, trade policy, development policy and security policy initiatives of the [European] member states, of the [European] Commission and the [European] Council, and of other multilateral actors, including the United Nations, the World Bank, the IMF and regional institutions" (SGESC, 2004: 17).

The war on terrorism has had an acute impact upon human security as a centralising technology of international biopolitical order. The predominance of homeland security concerns means that issues of illicit and uncontrolled circulation – of people, weapons, commodities, money, ideologies, and so on – emanating from, and flowing through, the world’s crisis zones, now influence the consolidating biopolitical function of development. Security considerations are increasingly evident in arguments to increase the proportion of development resources directed to measures, regions and sub-populations deemed critical in relation to the dangers of radical international interdependence.

While greater interconnection is often celebrated, during the 1990s it was increasingly argued that ‘globalisation’ can cut both ways. An interdependent world also has more uncertainties and hence increased risk (Beck 1992), including the ability of inequalities visited on the South to ‘boomerang’ on the North (George 1992). While globalisation and ‘network society’ have generated undreamt flows of wealth, they have also widened old disparities and encouraged new forms of exclusion, all of which can foment illicit, criminal and destabilising forms of global flows and movement (Castells 1998). As President Bush’s *National Security Strategy* sees it, the fruits of liberal-democracy are under threat from a new global danger. In today’s radically interconnected world, in which borders are increasingly porous, enemies are no longer the massed armies of opposing state encampments but their opposite: transnational global terrorist networks “...organised to penetrate open societies and to turn the power of modern technologies against us” (Bush, 2002: v). Securing freedom necessitates stopping the spread of terrorist networks through closing home bases, preventing new sanctuaries from forming, and stemming the proliferation of weapons, funds and recruits.

In achieving security, securing failed and fragile states has been identified as pivotal. Whereas ineffective states were treated with relative neglect during the 1990s (Newburg, 1999) they are now the subject to renewed policy interest. While crisis states are still regarded in terms of the criminality, breakdown and chaos associated with a sovereign void, that void is now regarded as vulnerable to colonisation by political extremism able to propagate on the fragmentation, poverty and alienation among the non-insured populations encountered. A recent speech by Hilary Benn, the Secretary of State for International Development, suggested that “...one of the main reasons why it is proving so hard to achieve Millennium Development Goals is the concentration of the poorest in crisis states” (Benn, 2004: 2). DFID is working with the FCO, MoD and the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit to improve Britain’s ability to respond by devising an integrated approach that “...combines development programmes with diplomatic engagement and security interventions. The common goal is reducing the risk of state crises” (Ibid: 3). With respect to the UN, 2005 is the year that it will respond to Kofi Annan’s High Level Panel on how to address state failure under the UN Charter and thus discourage the unilateralism of recent years. According to Benn, this is a chance for the UN to identify state crises and work with the World Bank and other agencies in order to act “...decisively when human security is at risk” (Ibid: 4).

The newfound concern over failed states indicates that the war on terror is not simply a military campaign. It is a multidimensional conflict that also engages with questions of poverty, development and internal conflict. The *National Security Strategy*, together with the OECD (DAC, 2003) and the EU (Solana, 2003), all highlight development assistance as a strategic tool in the war against terrorism. The Development Assistance Committee's *Lens on Terrorism* report, for example, illustrates that while the regional containment of the effects of poverty and conflict remains important, current policy has broadened to address issues of leakage and interpenetration. Insurgent populations, shadow economies and violent networks are the new global danger in a world "...of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked" (Ibid: 5). In an echo of the 1990s 'the poor are attracted to violent leaders' argument, the *Lens on Terrorism* sees terrorist insurgency as stemming from a sense of anger arising from exclusion, injustice and helplessness. In this situation, terrorist leaders, who may themselves be motivated by grievances and resentment, "...feed on these factors and exploit them, gathering support for their organisations" (DAC 2003: 11). The package of developmental measures designed for offsetting alienation and promoting self-reliance involves a complex set of biopolitical interventions with the ultimate goal of building "...the capacity of communities to resist extreme religious and political ideologies based on violence" (Ibid: 8). Education and job opportunities become key, reflecting the concern that the new global danger no longer necessarily lies with the abject poor, who are fixed in their misery: instead, it pulses from those mobile sub-populations capable of bridging and circulating between the dichotomies of North/South; modern/traditional; and national/international.

Aid agencies and the rephrasing of development

Some advocates of human security are keen to assert the complementarities and even indivisibility of homeland and borderland security. The authors of *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe*, for example, suggest that Europe's military forces "...need to be able to address the real security needs of people in situations of severe insecurity in order to make the world a safer place for Europeans" (SGESC 2004: 7). The "...whole point of a human security approach", the authors argue, "...is that Europeans cannot be secure while others in the world live in severe insecurity" (Ibid: 10). Similarly, to assert the inextricable link between security and development has become something of a cliché: no development without security and no security without development. Many NGOs and aid agencies however, stress that there are also tensions in trying to harness development as a tool of homeland security. Arguments based on 'enlightened self-interest' often gloss over real tensions between domestically-oriented security priorities and Southern-oriented development priorities. The worry is that 'their' security and development are becoming important only insofar as they are a means towards 'ours'. Areas where the causal links are less apparent are liable to fall by the wayside. As the Commission for Human Security argues, current approaches to conflict "...focus on coercive, short-term strategies aimed at stopping attacks by cutting off financial, political or military support and apprehending possible perpetrators", rather than "...addressing the underlying causes related to inequality, exclusion and marginalisation, and aggression by states as well as people" (CHS 2003: 23-24). The focus on circulation as opposed to consolidation, with

its threats to institutional independence arising from politically directed aid, is of concern to many UN agencies, NGOs and aid organisations.

For a number of critics, the politicisation of development has invited comparisons with the Cold War. The reappearance has been noted, for example, of the re-appearance of official assistance, including arms sales and trade concessions, as a reward political allegiance. (Christian Aid, 2004; also see Cosgrave, 2004; BOND, 2003; CHS, 2003). What Christian Aid has dubbed 'the new Cold War' it sees "...*terrorism* replacing *communism* as the bogey" (Cosgrave, 2004: 15). However, while having a rhetorical force, the analogy is misleading. During the Cold War, erstwhile Third World states were part of competing superpower geopolitical alliances. While cooperative borderland states, especially strategically located ones, are currently being reappraised in assistance terms, the alliance is essentially biopolitical. Instead of being ranged outwards militarily, as it were, towards other states and political blocs, it is directed inwards towards securing territory and, importantly, policing the flows and contingencies of economy and population. While the war on terrorism has renewed international interest in promoting effective states, these transitional entities are being reconstructed around the control of core biopolitical functions in the interests of global security.

Poverty reduction remains axiomatic to development assistance. The threat of global terrorism, however, has highlighted the importance of transitional populations living in volatile and strategic regions. Their frustration and alienation, although not causing terrorism, proves a fertile breeding ground for recruitment. While reducing absolute income poverty remains important, "...approaches to inequality and exclusion should be given increased priority" (DAC 2003: 8). This is not the universalistic poverty focus that has gained ground since the 1980s in the shape of sustainable development. Poverty reduction here is concerned with delineating the poorest members of society and bettering their position. As the NGO members of the Global Security and Development Network have argued in a joint statement to DAC, despite flagging the importance of poverty reduction, the *Lens on Terrorism* can be interpreted as "...the redirection of aid away from poverty reduction and towards a counter-terrorism and security agenda" (BOND, 2003: 1; also see Christian Aid 2004; Woods, 2004).

For many aid agencies, the war on terrorism has reversed the progress made during the 1990s in affirming human rights. In particular, the threat of terrorism has given states the opportunity to derogate from existing human rights treaties on the grounds of security (Cosgrave 2004). Not only has the practice of detention without trial reappeared in countries such as the USA and Britain, many members of the global 'coalition of the willing' have used existing legislation or passed new national security laws which, critics argue, have used terrorism as pretext for repressing legitimate internal opposition. Human rights organisations have raised such concerns, for example, in relation to India, China, Thailand, Pakistan, Nepal, Zimbabwe, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, South Africa, Nigeria, Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania (Ibid: 27-35). This repressive climate has had a widespread negative impact on those aid agencies working in relation to civil society and its empowering to express legitimate concerns and frustrations. As reflected in the proscribing of organisations in the 2000 Terrorism Act (Fekete 2001), many groups

struggling for self-determination and against the use of arbitrary power have been outlawed.

The reversal of human rights is also matched by the curtailment of what aid agencies call 'humanitarian space' (FIFC, 2004). During the 1990s, the military doctrine among leading states was to support civilian humanitarian agencies and to only become directly involved in humanitarian activities as a last resort. Since Kosovo, and especially Afghanistan, this situation has changed (Donini et al. 2004). Humanitarian assistance, especially in relation to crisis states, has increasingly been coloured by political considerations. In Afghanistan as well as Iraq, humanitarian assistance, development and social reconstruction have been redrafted as a legitimating support for transitional state entities and their transformation into show-case examples of regional stability. This places tremendous responsibilities upon cooperating aid agencies and draws them directly into an exposed political process. At the same time, due to widespread insecurity and insurgency violence, the military has moved beyond protection and become directly involved in activities it labels as 'humanitarian'. This includes repairing essential infrastructure and delivering supplies. As some NGOs argue, however, such undertakings "...are more properly described as military intervention in pursuit of a political goal" (Christian Aid 2004: 23).

At the operational level, the most obvious casualty has been the neutrality of aid organisations. In many respects, the war on terrorism is weakening what, in the past, has been an important strength of NGOs: a non-governmental legitimacy and authority derived from the liminal space between national supporters and constituencies, and the communities and civil society actors with who they work. Non-governmental organisations are aware that, from the perspective of many local populations, they have become indistinguishable from occupying forces or the allies of intrusive governments (Vaux, 2004). Whether or not the perceived proximity between NGOs and an expansive Western sovereignty is real or imagined, the perception itself is damaging and destabilising. The bombing of the Baghdad headquarters of the UN and ICRC in August 2003 are graphic illustrations of the new situation that aid agencies find themselves in. Many have begun to ask whether the benefits that aid workers bring is "...now outweighed by the price that they are being asked to pay" (Foley, 2004). Through the ambushing of convoys, rocketing of premises and the booby-trapping of vehicles, over 40 aid workers have been murdered in Afghanistan in the past year alone. Currently, whole swathes of Afghanistan and Iraq are no-go areas for NGOs. Many, especially European agencies have already left Iraq because, as the murder of the head of Care International, Margaret Hassan, has shown, the level of insecurity is now unacceptable.

Conclusion: the changing security terrain

As reflected in the sense of crisis among many non-governmental aid agencies, the war on terrorism has brought to a head a longer-term shift. That is, from being outside the state during the 1960s and 1970s, NGOs have progressively become adjuncts and implementing partners of policies and interventionary strategies emanating from effective states, especially within crisis zones. Once the champions of 'grass-roots' solidarity as

against 'top down' official development, some agencies fear they have become uncritical accomplices of Western foreign policy. Coming to terms with the new security environment including reappraising relations with donor governments, transitional authorities and the armed forces, has acquired significant urgency. A difficulty here however, is that although an interconnection between NGOs and western states contradict the NGO ethos of independence, many organisations were either supportive or complicit with the initial deepening of state/non-state linkages during the 1990s. NGOs that now endorse the 'new Cold War' position, for example, themselves encouraged moves for greater coherence between aid and politics in the past (IDC, 1999). The issue then was not that aid and politics were incompatible; it was that in many crisis states, including Rwanda in 1994, there was a lack of political interest and involvement by donor governments (Macrae and Leader, 2000). NGOs, for example, were an active part of the 1998 Strategic Framework for Afghanistan. This was an exploratory UN programme based on the explicit attempt to integrate aid and politics (Duffield et al. 2002). At this stage, the coherence agenda promised to better channel development resources towards poverty alleviation among non-insured population. Today, however, as states have become more actively involved, it is feared that this shared agenda is likely to see development subsumed under foreign policy objectives (Woods, 2004). While many NGOs were driven by the growing acceptance of a responsibility to protect during the 1990s, as that responsibility has matured into the war on terrorism, some are having second thoughts.

As a centralising technology of international governance, the vision of human security that began to hit its stride towards the end of the 1990s involved the biopolitical securing of non-insured populations through bringing together the existing practices, institutions and networks of sustainable development. It envisaged a horizontal and coordinated system of cross-border interventions, indeed – a new, multileveled planetary infrastructure – able to complement, or temporarily replace, the efforts of ineffective states. The war on terrorism has problematised this particular governmental formula of human security. Rather than prioritising the security of people living within the territories of ineffective states (which human security does) the security of 'homeland' populations and infrastructures has moved to the fore. In a radically interdependent world, defending metropolitan livelihood systems and essential infrastructures, in short, its way of life, is premised upon securing the 'borderland' of crisis and ineffective states. Compared to earlier more universalistic notions of human security, a sharper focus on sub-populations and strategic territories distinguished by their potential to circulate and interconnect has gained ground in policy discourse. This narrowing in order to then broaden through the reform and reprioritisation of development administration, together with the implicit loyalty test this manoeuvre embodies, has caused a sense of unease among many historically independent NGOs. At the same time, however, the new security terrain has also created fresh opportunities for others.

In stressing the fragility of international borders and the growing interconnectedness of livelihood systems and economic dependencies across homeland and borderland populations (Blair, 2001), the war on terrorism has deepened the interconnection between development and security and, in the interests of better policing global circulation,

created new possibilities for coordination and centralisation. OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC), for example, has suggested that the new players in the war on terrorism include "...financial analysts, bankers, arms control and bio-chemical experts, educators, communications specialists, development planners and religious leaders" (DAC 2003: 10). The collapse within political imagination of the national/international dichotomy also makes it possible to envisage a further deepening of coherence between aid and politics. For example, between the domestic or 'home' functions of sovereign government and its international or 'foreign' departments. New datasets, the merging of existing ones, together with hybrid means of surveillance and bridging institutional forms, conjures the possibility of being able to interconnect and act on populations on a planetary scale (I-CAMS 2005). That is, as local to local informational connections between insured homeland and non-insured borderland populations, infrastructures and economies. Competing with the aid-based vision of cross-border alliances of existing support networks, as envisioned in *Human Security Now*, new possibilities for centralisation are emerging. For example, in relation to better integrating the policing of international migration with the search for domestic social cohesion, especially among ethnically divided communities, and new intrusive technologies to reconstruct and manage fragile states (see Strategy Unit 2005). However, does this prospect of being able to act upon homeland and borderland populations as a complex, interconnected whole herald a new vision of human security, or does it signal a global biopolitical tyranny?

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